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Tor consensus transparency

  • once per hour 9 directory authorities (dir-auths) create a vote

    • send the votes to the other dir-auths
    • then they compute two consensus flavors
  • consensus-transparency

    • submits consensus to a transparency, append-only log; it gives a prove back without going to the log one can check that
    • have a monitor that can detect when a dir-auth key has been used (key usage transparency for operator)
    • consensus transparency adds the prove and monitoring part on the other trans logging infrastructure
    • current status: 2/9 dir-auths are submitting to a log and linus runs a monitor
    • monitor fetches from collector and has the keys included from the dir-auths who are submitting
      • weird if something that shows up on collector but not in the log; could be an attack
      • something that is in the log but not on collector could expose collector bugs (archive transparency)
      • if the trans log is lying this will show up in the monitor as well
    • it sends issues to the metrics-alerts@ mailing list
  • Next steps

    • a step forward would be requiring proofs for consensuses before accepting/using them; or make the mechanism maybe optionally available and interesting parties could enable the requirement if they wanted to
    • why not trans logging a vote as a next step as well
    • we could monitor vote splitting attacks (see an example in our Gitlab bug tracker); right now we only have monitoring via consensus-health for it enabled, but someone would have to look at that every hour
    • packaging consensus-transparency tooling; there are potentially a lot of keys that need to get handled which is easier via some packaging
    • bridge authority could submit things are well to the log
    • monitor could fetch votes and documents as well (for backups at least for instance)
    • web interface for monitor to walk the directory tree
    • set up a Prometheus endpoint for alerting alternative to email
  • monitor has a fetch phase and then checking whether it should do something with the files fetched

  • glasklar, mullvad are running the trans logs
  • we could use trans logging for tor git commits and then hook that up into our CI and use it in our release process
  • think about what it is important from relays to save into a consensus-transparency log; maybe some keys that we could watch for for potential compromise