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OHTTP exit nodes

  • how can we provide A some privacy when they are trying to update their package list checking B and their attestations
 A ->   fetch key   -> B
 apt-get           + attestations
   \                      /
    \------- relay ------/
  • no open relay at cloudflare

  • some exit operator said they could run an open version

  • the specification discourages public relays

  • Solutions:

    • POST /ohttp/example.com: received and forwarded to example.com[/path]; most risky one is allowing arbitrary paths (all HTTP abuse from the Tor network)
    • less risky only /.well-known/ohttp-gateway, any site
      • people would be opting in
    • DNS discovery mandatory (HTTPS DNS reocrd type)
  • the site owner has to opt into that

  • ocloak tool implements the three options above

  • the `example.comĀ“ part in the first example is not in the standard

  • exit operators would need a domain name and certificate to participate

  • Why ocloak

    • less dependencies
    • tor exit nodes are often blocked
    • smaller solution
    • ocloak could be used as pluggable transport so a censor would only see that someone is connecting to a public (ocloak) relay which could then forward stuff to the Tor network
  • pvcli