OHTTP exit nodes¶
- how can we provide A some privacy when they are trying to update their package list checking B and their attestations
A -> fetch key -> B
apt-get + attestations
\ /
\------- relay ------/
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no open relay at cloudflare
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some exit operator said they could run an open version
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the specification discourages public relays
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Solutions:
POST /ohttp/example.com: received and forwarded to example.com[/path]; most risky one is allowing arbitrary paths (all HTTP abuse from the Tor network)- less risky only
/.well-known/ohttp-gateway, any site- people would be opting in
- DNS discovery mandatory (HTTPS DNS reocrd type)
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the site owner has to opt into that
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ocloaktool implements the three options above -
the `example.com“ part in the first example is not in the standard
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exit operators would need a domain name and certificate to participate
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Why
ocloak- less dependencies
- tor exit nodes are often blocked
- smaller solution
- ocloak could be used as pluggable transport so a censor would only see that someone is connecting to a public (ocloak) relay which could then forward stuff to the Tor network