The PQ situation at Tor¶
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discussion started in 2016 with Isis's/Peter Schwabe's proposal
- NewHope handshake
- lost steam within Tor
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ML-KEM got specified by NIST
- IETF has some general guidance around PQ
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later in Tor proposal 355
- looking at Tor in mutliple layers
- TLS layer
- circuit layer
- signarures/onion services (active attacker)
- we are not concerned with the third case at this point as the PQ schemes here have very large keys and signatures and an attack here is unlikely right now
- looking at Tor in mutliple layers
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openssl 3.5 has ML-KEM support in hybrid mode
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situation at Tor relays
- in February 2026 31.2% of relays supported PQ handshakes
- right now (November 2026) the number has grown to 62.6%
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libressl got support as well; we need to figure out, though, whether there is some cipher suite PQ overlap in the openssl/libressl space
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circuit layer PQ work depends on pack/frag proposal in arti where we can split up 509 byte cells
- we can control the KEM part here, but need to use whatever is available in the TLS space, so we could theoretically use something different for the circuit layer
- do we want to use a pure one instead of the hybrid one?
- for signatures the situation is very open; for onion services there is no design either available yet
- there is no timeline for the circuit layer/signatures yet, only TLS is considered now
- next step would be to apply for funding to fix the circuit layer
- focus only on openssl/libressl; boringssl doesn't do any releases